The Arab World, as (nearly) everyone has seen, has been engulfed by popular revolutions, some successful (as in Egypt and Tunisia). Publics in a variety of different Arab countries have risen up against autocratic and dictatorial rules, fighting for rights long denied to them by a corrupt and manipulative leadership.
In Tunisia, we have probably the best example of a popular uprising. In a country long considered one of (if not the) most liberal in the Arab and Muslim world, people rose up against the President, protesting high unemployment in a country with a prospering economy and protesting the massive corruption of the ruling elite. Their continual protests and the unwillingness of the army to fight the protesters eventually convinced long-time President Ben-Ali to flee the country. In Egypt, the crowds, inspired by Tunisian popular success, took to protesting the heavy-handed authoritarian rule of a long-time dictator and the suppression of civil rights for years for no apparent reason. However, Mubarak, although making some concessions initially was very reluctant to resign until one day when his appointed Vice President announced he was leaving and the army would be in control. In Libya, a similar pattern appears to have happened. Citizens chaffing at the excesses of the regime have risen against it, although it may also have the makings of a tribal dispute. In Bahrain, the majority Shi’ites have risen against the minority Sunni rulers, in what seems like a predictable revolt. Yemen, Oman and Jordan have seen similar, but less violent and massive protests.
Protestors against the regime in Bahrain
I am by no means an area expert on each or any of these individual places. So, I’m going to leave the detailed analysis of local circumstances to other people. However, there are a few common points that have resonated throughout each of these revolutions that are worth discussing.
1) The Role of the Military/Security Services: This is one area in which not nearly enough attention is being paid right now. The media and many people seem focused on the massive displays of the protests by people (which are generally unprecedented in modern Arab political history and should not be discounted) as the movers of these revolution. People are very upset and seizing upon the popular momentum to express their grievances. But to my eye, popular protest is not what eventually tips the scales against the regimes. Yes, there are a lot of people protesting against these governments. But the amount of force and security personnel that can be deployed against them is equally (if not more) powerful (see the Mubarak suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1990s and Hafez al-Asad’s complete destruction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria in 1982 as excellent examples of this).
In my opinion, what made the difference in these revolutions was the position of the army/security services–see my statements here and here. When the army in Tunisia said that it refused to fire on the protesters, the regime was in dire straits, as its ability to use force was greatly diminished. Now, as the revolt draws nearer to Qaddafi in Tripoli and he loses control of most of the country, large parts of his security forces and government have abandoned him and gone over to support the people, which has further led to gains against the regime (think of the 2 pilots flying to Malta as defectors for an example). And in Egypt, Mubarak went on television and said he would not step down immediately, but after the elections as originally announced (which elicited great disgust on the part of those watching). However, only a day later, he resigned. What happened? Although we didn’t see it and may never definitively know, the army forced him out. They had issued a statement 2 days before his resignation saying they would guard the constitution and liberties of the people. Then, after Mubarak resigned, they said they would run the country until elections. Clearly, it seems as though the army, which had refused to suppress the demonstrators in large part in Egypt, intervened and told Mubarak that he would be resigning. Thus, up to this point in the events, the army/security forces of the various countries in revolt seem to be directing the course of the revolutions. (And this also helps explain why maybe there hasn’t been a sniff of unrest in a place like Syria, which isn’t known as being particularly friendly to its people or the opposition at times.)
Protestors in Libya (Associated Press)
2) A popular revolution? This is related to what I said above. Yes, the popular protests are quite large and show a genuine feeling of dislike and anger toward the regimes. However, the people are simply the facilitators for the actual moving of the revolution. Those that hold the power (i.e. the military and government high-ups) are seizing the moment (to use a cliche) to make a change (for their better?). However, the ability of the people to extract political freedoms is quite remarkable and seemingly unprecedented, a possible trend I discussed here. One of the lasting effects of these events may be the opening of the authoritarian political systems of the countries undergoing revolutions (and possibly many others). In addition to the changing of the leadership region-wide, the freedoms gained may be equally important in the long run.
3) The Islamist factor: This is the topic that seems to be hovering beneath the surface on many people’s minds, called an “Islamic bogeyman” by a few. Have these revolutions been driven by Islamists? Is this simply the pretext for Islamist groups to take over in these countries? Up to this point, it would appear that these are not Islamic revolution and not directed by Islamic groups. However, Islamist groups in these countries do seem to be taking the opportunity to probe chances for their success. In Tunisia and Egypt, we have seen Islamic leaders return to the country after long-time bans to large displays of public support (Khomeini in the late 1970s anyone?). And in both places, the Islamists say that they will participate in elections when they happen. While the Islamist groups are not the main power brokers at the moment, they are there. Keep in mind that the 1979 Islamic Revolution did not begin for religious reasons–it began as a popular protest for economic reasons against a very unpopular and authoritarian rule, exactly what happened (and is happening) in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Whether or not we look back in years to come and say this was the “Tunisian Islamic Revolution” or “Egyptian Islamic Revolution” depends on how the current power brokers allow Islamists to participate in the new political life of their countries.
4) The Role of the United States: The reaction of the U.S. government has been a truly interesting study. Criticized in 2009 for not helping the protesters in Iran against the Ahmedinejad regime, the Obama administration seems to have actually tried to engage in the events of these revolutions. However, their involvement has been truly mistifying. In Tunisia, they were shown (by Wikileaks) to have continued to support former President Ben Ali as an ally in the war on terror until such a point that they realized that he would fall. Then, they issued vague statements supporting the “rights of the Tunisian people.” Then, in Egypt, they immediately threw their support behind the protesters and urged Mubarak to step down. However, this would seemingly be against their interests, as Mubarak had been a long-time supporter of U.S. goals, maintained the peace treaty with Israel, and stopped support from reaching Hamas. While I’m not going to debate the merits of whether this policy is moral or correct, the U.S. seemed to fly against their own interests. Now, as theLibyan regime commits atrocities against its own people (and their leaders come out and say it on television), the U.S., having placed itself in the “promoting democracy corner” of events, refuses to intervene to protect people or even their own citizens. It is as if they don’t understand the realities of the region and what is going on, but are simply going with the tide. It would seem that the U.S. government is scared, ala Jimmy Carter in 1979 of making the wrong step and being remembered as a failure in a foreign policy situation.
However, without a doubt, we are seeing a historic time in the region, with a changing of the guard. However, in some ways, it seems as though business is progressing as usual. What the region will look like in the future will be determined, but it depends on the choices of the current power elites in the country.
